The new British government has initiated a Strategic Defence Review which is expected to report in 2025.  And there is no doubt that – along with others – this is vital work.

But what we have learned from contexts like Ukraine is that reliance on technology – taking the human out of the battlespace – is at best only a partial solution.  Ukraine again, and other contexts less obviously characterised as war fighting but equally threatening to UK concerns, shows us that alone the ability to fight on the battlefield is not enough.

Yes, our enemies need to fear us; and our allies need to know that come the call we can and will be there.  But in today’s poly-polar world, there are large numbers of other actors who at best might be thought of as the undecided.  They may be paralysed by a resentful fear of our war fighting ability but keeping them in coalition with us is more about inspiring their willing respect – and this is as much a civilian-strategic function based on soft power as it is about the virility of our hard power capabilities.

The UK’s Integrated Operating Concept (IOC) speaks in terms of four spheres in which the UK military needs to be effective.

It needs to be able to protect that UK from threats near and far – as much in terms of fighting as in terms of deterring our enemies from fighting in the first place.  This amounts to an ability to deny our enemies the freedom to attack us.

It needs to be able to engage with others – both our declared allies and those whose support we would welcome but who might otherwise usefully be kept on the sidelines.  This is largely an influencing function – either to deter the chancers or to reassure those not determined to attack the UK and its interests.

It needs to be able to constrain those whose inclination, instincts or interests are served by attacking the UK – either directly or indirectly.  This is about demonstration of UK ability, strength, reach and alliances.  It may involve force – and as such needs to be effective – but will fall short of the threshold of war.

And if needs be, it needs to be able to fight.

But arguably none of these spheres – protect; engage; constrain; fight – are exclusively a military space these days.  Indeed, in the first three the role of defence – aside from being capable and ready – is to support the civilian-strategic functions of government.

Even fighting – which does require effective military force and in which the role of the rest of government is to support defence – is often won or lost in the hearts and minds of enemies and allies alike by means other than war.

So, whilst it is important to ensure that defence has the capabilities to support UK interests right up to and including war fighting, it is shooting in the dark to transform defence without first defining the strategic intent to which defence capability must contribute; and secondly to ensure that the UK can ‘fight’ in all the domains in which it is being tested.

And in the majority of these domains, the foot soldiers of this fight are much more likely to be marching to the drumbeat of soft power.  They will be in the foxholes of the BBC World Service, manning the trenches at the British Council, rallying the battalions of effective international development, streaming up the beaches of culture, art and music, staffing the Forward Operating Bases of academia and parachuting out of the skies of trade.

To transform the UK’s defence capabilities in isolation is akin to a nervous dog barking at midnight shadows. Defence is both supported by and plays a supporting role in the delivery of UK stability, security and prosperity.  It needs to be capable, but to be effective it needs to be able to operate in an integrated manner alongside all the capabilities of British society.