Tigray has suffered a civil war of devastating proportions. The fighting is now over, but the challenge of re-building a fractured society still remains. One of these challenges is the question of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). But that challenge does not stand in isolation – Tigray is a place where everything is urgent; and everything is inter-dependent.
The war itself came to an end with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022. In truth, Pretoria was not a peace agreement, but a cessation of hostilities agreement (COHA). It described an integrated suite of inter-related processes necessary to establish the conditions for a future peace. DDR was one element of this – but as a contribution to enduring peace and stability, it needs to be seen as part of an integrated response.
Some of the processes envisaged by COHA have yet to be fully implemented. Outside forces remain on Tigrayan territory; and although DDR is (sort of) underway, other processes like reconstruction, reconciliation, etc are either stalled, constrained or not in place.
There is an implication in COHA that political process (intra-Tigray and between Tigray and the Federal government in Addis Ababa) will describe the conditions for a future peace; and at the same time that service delivery would underpin those conditions.
But bad politics – within the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF); within Tigray; between Tigray and the Federal government; between the Federal government and actors in other regions; and between Ethiopia and other states in the Horn of Africa and beyond – have conspired to de-rail or distract the necessary political process to set the conditions for that future peace.
And a near total lack of capability and resources on the part of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) has also constrained practical action.
The result of these failures are friction, tension, frustration and paralysis – all of which has fed a politically charged atmosphere.
Recent pronouncements in Tigray – by both the political and military leaderships – have further charged that atmosphere. Debretsion Gebremicheal, chair of the TPLF, seemed to threaten pull the region back to the brink of conflict; and a group of Tigray Defence Force (TDF) leaders who support him appeared to side with him against TIRA, led by its chair, Getachew Reda leader of an opposing TPLF faction.
But popular reaction to these threats – including from TPLF supporters from all sides – has been overwhelmingly negative. And in the face of widespread demonstrations, the Debretsion faction and its military allies appear to have done nothing. Their threats have proved empty, potentially puncturing the mystique which has previously surrounded them.
There is then just a chance that the lockjaw of Tigrayan political life may be easing slightly.
But the problem is not limited to the one faction of the TPLF. Others – TIRA, the TPLF Getachew faction, and other non TPLF actors – are just as guilty of distraction and self-interest. But without the effective threat of military action in support of the Debretsion faction, there is an opportunity to address the planning and management weaknesses so that TIRA can finally be seen to be starting to deliver.
Alongside DDR, the most urgent need from a political-security perspective is security sector reform – essentially to ensure that the weapons and soldiers which are the subject of DDR remain beyond use and cannot be held out as an ongoing military threat. But following closely behind will be reconstruction and return.
Ultimately Tigray needs a dialogue about the shape and nature of its future political dispensation. Generational change will be essential to sustainable peace. There are growing signs of demand for change – especially from the younger generation – but the necessary consensus is unlikely to emerge in the current polarised climate.
Meanwhile, Tigrayans need to see that someone – anyone – cares about their future. The opportunity exists now for at least TIRA to show them that it does.
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